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Abstract
Decades of hindsight bias has shown it to be a robust phenomenon exhibited in
many different hypothetical and real-world situations. Two competing models of
hindsight bias, the cognitive sense-making model and the motivational model, were used
to predict hindsight bias effects for a situation dealing with strongly polarized opinions.
Participants read about a physician who prescribed medical marijuana to a child with
self-injurious behaviors and then received a positive outcome, negative outcome, or no
outcome at all (control group). Those holding a negative view of illegal drugs exhibited
hindsight bias following both positive (d = 1.13) and negative outcomes (d = .36). Those
with a positive view of illegal drugs showed no hindsight effect for either positive (d =
.19) or negative outcomes (d =.09). Participants exhibiting the bias appear to have had
less extreme views than those who showed no hindsight bias. Results are partially
consistent with previous research that examined motivational and sense-making
components of hindsight bias. Future research should focus on examining different
strongly held beliefs (e.g., attitudes towards the death penalty or gun control laws) to
further understand the mechanisms associated with hindsight bias judgments.

1

Introduction

Hindsight bias, or the tendency to believe in hindsight that one would have judged
an outcome’s likelihood to be higher than they actually would in foresight, was first
documented by Fischhoff (1975). Although its effect size varies somewhat (ChristensenSzalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004), the
hindsight bias is a remarkably robust phenomenon, having been demonstrated in
numerous domains including medicine (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981),
decision making (Sligo & Stirton, 1998), and politics (Holzl & Kirchler, 2005).
Ironically, the bias is strongest for those outcomes that are least expected and
results from our attempt to make sense of such outcomes (Pezzo, 2003). Sense-making
tends to overemphasize antecedents believed to cause the outcome and underemphasize
antecedents that would lead to alternative outcomes (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Blank &
Peters, 2007). This evaluation culminates in the integration of this biased information
into memory, ultimately leading us to misremember our own predictions and actually
believe we were better at estimating the probability of the outcome than we really were
(Blank & Peters, 2000). It is important not only to examine conditions under which
hindsight bias is exhibited but also those in which the bias does not occur. Specifically,
there are three competing models that predict when hindsight bias will and will not occur;
the motivational model that takes into account defensive processing (Mark & Mellor,
1991; Louie, 1999), the cognitive sense-making model that takes into account outcome
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expectation (Pezzo, 2003), and the motivated sense-making model that combines aspects
of both (Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007).
Since the bias has been exhibited in both hypothetical and real-world situations
with negative effects, a number of attempts at reducing the bias have been made, most
notably, by Arkes and colleagues (1988). Participants in their study were randomly
assigned to either a foresight condition - where they were not given any outcome
information at any point during the study - or one of three hindsight conditions and read
an identical patient case history. All participants were given three possible diagnoses and
asked to provide a probabilistic rating for each. Those in the hindsight conditions
received an extra line informing them which of the three possible diagnoses was the
patient’s actual diagnosis. Then, adapting a procedure from Koriat, Lichtenstein, and
Fischhoff (1980), half of the participants were asked to provide reasons for all possible
diagnoses in addition to their ratings. This required them not only to consider supportive
reasons for their diagnosis but also for the alternative diagnoses as well. Consistent with
Koriat and colleagues’ (1980) findings, those not asked to generate reasons showed
hindsight bias when the correct diagnosis was included in the case history. When
participants were asked to include reasons for each possible diagnosis, however, they
were much less likely to show the bias. Essentially, such a debiasing technique extends
the sense-making process to include not only the actual diagnosis, but also alternative
(counterfactual) diagnoses. In doing so, people may realize that the known outcome is
not as “obvious” as they first perceived it to be.
Using counterfactuals as a debiasing method may backfire, however, if generating
reasons for the alternative is difficult. Sanna and Schwarz (2003) randomly assigned
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students to generate either four or twelve ways in which the previous weekend’s college
football game could have turned out differently. Participants were then asked to indicate
what they would have guessed the score for each team would be, disregarding the actual
outcome. Although participants in the twelve-thoughts condition did generate more
alternatives than those in the four-thoughts condition, they actually showed more
hindsight bias for the known outcome than those only asked to generate four.
Presumably, the task of coming up with twelve different outcomes is more difficult than
generating only four, and this difficulty indicates that the sense-making process is failing.
Typically, of course, most people do not spontaneously try to generate twelve ways in
which the outcome could have been different, or hindsight bias would be considerably
less robust.
Nevertheless, there are instances where hindsight bias is decreased or may not
occur naturally, even when researchers do not actively use debiasing techniques.
Bodenhausen (1990), for example, asked participants to read a court case either dealing
with a violent assault or a molestation accusation. While some participants were not told
the outcome of the case, some were told that the defendant was found guilty and others
were told the defendant was found not guilty. What participants did not know was that
some received court cases dealing with stereotypical defendants while others received
non-stereotypical defendants. Authors manipulated the information about the defendant
to be consistent or inconsistent with popular stereotypes about groups that are more likely
to commit crimes. For example, in one version of the violent assault, the defendant’s
name was “Roberto Garcia” and in another version his name was “Robert Garner.”
Hindsight bias occurred for participants who received the non-stereotypical case; those
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who received a particular verdict overestimated the likelihood of that verdict based on the
evidence compared to those who did not receive any outcome information. Interestingly,
and regardless of the verdict, the stereotypical defendant was much more likely to be
viewed as guilty.
Motivational Model of Hindsight Bias: A Case for Defensive Processing
There also exist a small number of studies that have shown that internally driven,
motivational processes can reduce or remove the bias, particularly when the outcome is
embarrassing (see Pezzo, 2011 for a review). In the first of such defensive processing
studies (Mark & Mellor, 1991), laid off union workers were asked how foreseeable their
layoff was. The laid off workers were compared to other union workers who had survived
the layoff and to non-union community members in the surrounding area. The
community members reported that the outcome was more foreseeable than the layoff
survivors, who in turn reported the outcome more foreseeable than the laid off workers. If
the outcome had been foreseeable, then the laid off workers presumably could have done
something to reduce its likelihood (e.g., improve their work performance). Thus, in order
to reduce self-blame they must believe that the outcome was unforeseeable. Mark and
Mellor suggest that when asked to think about the event, laid off workers presumably
experienced very vivid and upsetting memories. The shock of those memories may have
prevented the typical hindsight bias. This study, however, did not include a control
group in which predictions were collected before the layoffs. Thus, it is impossible to
know if differences in foreseeability reflect a real hindsight bias or merely differences in
foresight across the conditions.
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Louie (1999) addressed this concern by including a true (no outcome) control
condition in her research. Participants in two studies were presented with information
about a company’s stock and then were asked whether they would recommend buying
into the stock. After making their decision, participants were randomly assigned to
receive no feedback or feedback (i.e., the stock value either increased or decreased) and
were asked to predict the stock’s change over the next year. Results suggest that people
show more hindsight bias when the outcome is favorable with their prior decision than if
the outcome is unfavorable. For example, participants who predicted that the stock value
would increase and then received feedback that the stock dramatically decreased
exhibited less hindsight bias than participants who received feedback that the stock value
increased. Presumably, the former did not want to seem incompetent during this task, so
defensive processing allowed them to assume that it was unforeseeable that the stock
value would decrease, essentially displacing any blame that may fall on them for making
such a prediction. Additionally, when participants were asked to list thoughts about the
outcome, those who received a favorable outcome tended to make internal attributions for
their ability to make the correct decision (e.g., buy the stock when it increased in value;
sell the stock when it decreased in value).
Pezzo and Beckstead (2008) extended this finding beyond the laboratory. They
asked participants to rate the likelihood of numerous positive and negative real-world
events that might occur in their near future. Weeks later, participants indicated whether
each event had actually occurred and to recall their original likelihood judgment.
Participants showed a reduction in the bias for negative or upsetting outcomes, which
further supports the defensive processing model of hindsight bias.
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Protected Values. Most people have strongly held beliefs. For example, the
belief in the right to bear arms, or the safety of one’s child may be so woven into the
fabric of our being that almost no challenge or threat to these beliefs will be considered.
Commitment to such “sacred” (Tetlock, 2003) or “protected” values (Baron and Spranca,
1997) has been shown to be so strong that people refuse to sacrifice them at any price.
Indeed, studies (Baron & Leshner, 2000) have shown that people can become threatened
or offended when they are asked to make - or even consider - such a compromise.
Belief Perseverance. Research on belief perseverance shows that beliefs may
persist in the face of damning contradictory evidence (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980).
Consider Nyhan and colleagues’ (2014) study on message effectiveness in vaccine
promotion. Parents of children under the age of 17 were assigned to one of four
interventions regarding the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) vaccine. They were
given information (from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) explaining the
lack of evidence that MMR causes autism, the dangers of the diseases prevented by
MMR, images of children with diseases prevented by MMR, or dramatic narrative about
an infant who almost died after contracting the measles. These interventions were
designed to reduce vaccine misperceptions and increase knowledge regarding the
intentions of vaccination. Nevertheless, these parents seemed to hold on to their false
beliefs in the face of readily available, salient (and scary) information about the dangers
of not vaccinating their child.
Anderson and Kellam (1992) suggest that these beliefs persevere because people
are particularly good at causal reasoning. For example, people may seek out
favorable/consistent information or discount new information that is contrary to their
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belief. When causal reasoning is disrupted or reduced, for instance by counting
backwards from 200 by 3s (Fleming & Arrowood, 1979) or by thinking about alternative
causes (Anderson, 1982), so is belief perseverance. However, there does not appear to be
any evidence to date that people will spontaneously disrupt causal reasoning on their
own.
Cognitive Sense-Making Model of Hindsight Bias: A Case for Expectancy
Processing
In contrast to the motivational model of hindsight bias that takes into account
defensive processing, the cognitive sense-making model takes into account outcome
expectancy. Pezzo (2003) showed that, under certain conditions, unexpected outcomes
may not produce much or any hindsight bias, regardless of whether or not they were
negative or upsetting. In particular, he found that the degree to which a person could
make sense of the outcome was highly predictive of the size of the bias it produced. In
this model, only unexpected outcomes that one can make sense of produce hindsight bias.
Expected outcomes do not require sense-making, and thus do not produce any bias, and
unexpected outcomes that one cannot make sense of also produce little or no hindsight
bias.
For example, Pezzo (2003) asked participants who scored in the upper and lower
range on an academic self-esteem measure to complete a cognitive abilities task and were
then either given false feedback (e.g., either positive or negative) or no feedback at all
(i.e., control group). Participants were asked to list their thoughts about the feedback
they received and then were asked to indicate what percentile they thought they would
fall into. Results showed that there was no hindsight bias when the participant received
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information that was congruent or expected but the bias was found for those participants
who received incongruent feedback.
Motivational Sense-making Model of Hindsight Bias: Composite Model
It is important to understand that both motivational and cognitive processes can be
at play in producing (or reducing) hindsight bias. For example, although Pezzo and
Beckstead (2008) found evidence for defensive processing (supporting the motivational
model), they also reported that whether or not an outcome confirmed one’s expectations
accounted for more variance in hindsight bias than whether or not it was upsetting. To
address this, Pezzo and Pezzo (2007) modified the cognitive sense-making model to
include motivational factors. The model still presumes that sense-making is necessary for
hindsight bias to occur but allows that defensive motives may produce an extended
search for causes that don’t implicate oneself for a negative outcome. This would explain
the occasional reports of “defensive pessimism” in which people appear to show greater
hindsight for upsetting events (Tykocinski, 2001). If no external (i.e., situational) reasons
can be found for an outcome, the model suggests that people may be motivated to
prematurely end the sense-making process without searching for self-implicating causes –
resulting in little or no bias. Finally, the model allows for the relatively small possibility
that when undeniable internal reasons do exist (i.e., the person is culpable) people may
actually experience hindsight bias, but in an effort to save face, they respond as though
they did not. Such a response is more likely to occur if the bias is measured by asking
people how “foreseeable” the response is than by the more traditional method of judging
the likelihood of the outcome used in this study (Blank & Peters, 2010).
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Purpose of Study/Expected Findings
The aim of this research was to assess the influence of potentially polarized and
strongly held beliefs regarding the use of unconventional medical treatments on hindsight
bias. Specifically, the influence of attitudes towards the use of marijuana in the treatment
of a child with developmental disabilities was assessed. Although still illegal in the state
of Florida, an amendment nearly passed in 2014 legalizing the use of medical marijuana
as prescribed by a physician for patients with chronic illnesses (Florida Department of
State Division of Elections, 2014). Results from the vote showed that close to 58% of
voters were in favor of the amendment while 42% were not, indicating that there is not a
major disparity between those that are for and against the use of medical marijuana. The
expectation is that a strong polarized opinion on the use of this medical treatment (either
pro or against) will mitigate the effects of a positive outcome but exacerbate the effects of
a negative outcome.
Pezzo’s (2003) cognitive sense-making model of hindsight bias would predict that
an expected outcome would produce no hindsight bias because the sense-making process
would not have been active. An unexpected outcome will produce hindsight bias as long
as the person is able to make sense of the outcome. If it is unexpected but the person
cannot make sense of the outcome, there will be reduced or no hindsight bias. In
contrast, the pure motivational model (Louie, 1999; Mark & Mellor, 1991) predicts that
only favorable outcomes or outcomes that are consistent with one’s beliefs will produce
hindsight bias. Whereas the cognitive sense-making model predicts hindsight bias for an
unexpected outcome, the pure motivational model would predict no bias, at least
assuming that an unexpected outcome is also unfavorable, and/or threatening to one’s
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strongly held beliefs. Additionally, the motivated sense-making model (Pezzo & Pezzo,
2007) was used to explain any findings that may not be explained in the first two models.
This model was not tested specifically because it is based on a search for external and
internal reasons for the outcome leading to either successful or unsuccessful sensemaking. The scenario being utilized was not personally relevant to the participants,
therefore a search for internal reasons that could have caused the outcome would be
impossible. Yet, if a finding did not fit with either the cognitive sense-making model or
the motivational model, this may suggest that a more compositional model, such as the
motivated sense-making model, may be necessary to explaining hindsight bias results for
moral decisions. See Tables 1.a (and Figure 1) and 1.b for predictions based on the
cognitive sense-making and the motivational model, respectively.
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Table 1.a Cognitive Sense-Making Model of Hindsight Bias Predictions
Symptoms after Treatment

Worsen

Improve

Pro-Drug

Unexpected  Bias*

Expected  No Bias

Anti-Drug

Expected  No Bias

Unexpected  Bias*

Note. *See Figure 1 below for influence of the sense-making process on the exhibition of
hindsight bias.

Outcome
Unexpected
1. Pro-Drug, Worsen
2. Anti-Drug, Improve

Expected
1. Pro-Drug, Improve
2. Anti-Drug, Worsen

Sense-Making
Process Activated

Sense-Making Process
not activated

Able to Make
Sense

Unable to
Make Sense

Bias

No Bias

No Bias

Figure 1. Hindsight Bias Predictions Based on the Cognitive Sense-Making Model.
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Table 1.b Motivational Model of Hindsight Bias Predictions
Symptoms after Treatment

Worsen

Improve

Pro-Drug

Unfavorable  No Bias

Favorable  Bias

Anti-Drug

Favorable  Bias

Unfavorable  No Bias
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Methods
Participants
Two hundred thirty-seven undergraduate psychology students from the University
of South Florida St. Petersburg participated in an anonymous online survey and received
extra credit in their psychology courses for participation. Participants were recruited
through SONA, an online experiment management system. Thirty-five participants were
removed due to incorrect responses to one or more manipulation check items in the
survey (e.g., choose the outcome of the scenario, choose the correct diagnosis of the child
in the vignette, etc.) or for failure to complete the survey, leaving a total of 202
participants.
Participants were predominantly female (88.1%) and white (64.9%). When asked
about their marijuana use, approximately 34% of participants indicated that they have
never used marijuana. For those who indicated they had used marijuana, usage varied
from once or twice (29.7%), occasional (25.7%), or regular use (10.4%). Approximately
55% of participants support the legalization of recreational marijuana use. Additionally,
most were also in favor of the legalization of medical marijuana for children and adults
under supervision, 69.3 and 87.6%, respectively. See Table 2 for additional demographic
information.
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Table 2 Demographic Characteristics
Characteristics

n

%

Female

178

88.1

Male

24

11.9

American Indian/Alaskan

2

1.0

Hawaiian Native or other Pacific Islander

1

0.5

Black

15

7.4

Asian American

13

6.4

Hispanic

21

10.4

White

131

64.9

Other

14

6.9

I wish not to answer

5

2.5

Never

69

34.2

Once or twice

60

29.7

Occasionally

52

25.7

Regularly

21

10.4

Gender

Ethnicity

Personal Use of Marijuana

Note. n = 202
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Procedures
In recent years, the use of medical marijuana to treat different medical conditions,
ranging from seizure disorders to nausea after chemotherapy to anxiety disorders, has
increased. According to the National Conference of State Legislature (March, 2015)
webpage, a total of 23 states currently have legalized medical marijuana statutes. One
particular use for medical marijuana is to treat children suffering from Autism Spectrum
Disorder (ASD) who are also exhibiting self-injurious behavior. Although there are no
recently published empirical studies examining the use of this medical treatment to date,
there is anecdotal evidence supporting the use of this treatment that participants may have
been exposed (e.g., reports in the newspaper or on television) to prior to participating in
the study.
All participants read a vignette (Appendix A) describing “Josh,” a 7-year-old
child diagnosed with ASD, who had recently developed self-injurious behaviors. Due to
the lack of empirical evidence regarding the use of medical marijuana, the vignette
included both supporting anecdotal information and reasons against the use of the
medical treatment (e.g., no empirical evidence, still illegal at the federal level). After a
discussion with their son’s physician about the benefits and risks of medical marijuana,
the vignette ends with the parents ultimately deciding to start their son on the
unconventional treatment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three “three
month assessment update” outcome conditions -- positive, negative, no outcome/control
(Appendix B) -- from Josh’s physician. Participants who were randomly assigned to
either the positive or negative outcome condition received the update of the child after
three months of using the medical marijuana treatment (see Appendix B). Those
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participants in the “No Outcome” or control condition were given no update on the
child’s condition. Finally, participants completed an additional questionnaire discussed
in the materials section below.
Hindsight Bias Scores. A hindsight bias score was calculated for each participant
receiving an outcome. For participants in the positive outcome condition, this score was
calculated by subtracting the mean likelihood rating (on a scale from 0-100) for the
relevant control condition from each individual’s likelihood rating. For participants in
the negative outcome condition, the score was calculated the same way and then
multiplied by -1. This was done so that a positive score always indicated hindsight bias,
and a negative score indicated reverse hindsight bias regardless of the outcome.
Hindsight Bias = Individual Likelihood - Mean of Relevant Control Condition
It is important to note that the mean of the relevant control condition was used to
calculate hindsight bias scores. That is, those with a pro-drug attitude in either the
positive or negative outcome condition were compared only to those with a pro-drug
attitude in the control condition.
Materials
The Drug-Related Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs Scale (DRKAB) (Bryan,
2000) was modified for the current study and administered to the participants prior to
reading the vignette in order to assess participants’ attitudes towards the use of marijuana.
The original scale assessed knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs of drug abuse/abuser as well
as direct questions about numerous illicit drugs including marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
ecstasy, and others. Items that were included for this study assessed overall attitudes and
beliefs of drug abuse/abuser in general (e.g., “All illegal drugs are equally harmful to
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your health,” “Our society is too tolerant towards drug users,” etc.) and specific items
concerning the use of marijuana (e.g., “The use of cannabis should not be against the
law,” “Occasional use of cannabis is not really dangerous,” etc.). The word “cannabis”
was replaced with the more commonly used word “marijuana” in order to make it less
technical and more understandable for all participants. All items utilized a 7-point rating
scale ranging from Disagree Strongly to Agree Strongly. For a complete list of scale
items, refer to Appendix C. Additionally, questions regarding the participants’ personal
use of marijuana, their knowledge of others around them using marijuana, and their
attitudes towards legalizing the use medical and recreational marijuana were asked along
with other demographic questions. For a complete list of demographic items, refer to
Appendix D.
After reading the vignette and receiving one of the three possible outcomes,
participants completed the Follow-Up Questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate the
likelihood that the drug treatment would be successful on a scale of 0-100 percent. If
participants were in either the positive or negative outcome group, they were explicitly
instructed to disregard the outcome information they received. Additionally, if
participants were in the positive/negative outcome condition group, they responded to
items that assessed how surprising the outcome was or how much sense the outcome
made on a 6-point rating scale ranging from Not At All to Completely. All participants
rated how risky the treatment was how severe the child’s condition was, and how
confident they would have to be in the drug’s effectiveness before giving it to their own
child. Participants were also asked whether the physician met “standard of care” (i.e.,
defined as “the caution that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would exercise
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in providing care to a patient”) and to provide reasons for their judgment. For a complete
list of scale items, please refer to Appendix E.
Results
Basic Hindsight Bias Effects
Participants were categorized as either Pro-drug or Anti-drug based on their
response to the following item from the DRKAB Scale: “All illegal drugs are equally
harmful to your health” (see Figure 1). This question was used alone rather than using a
combined score across all of the DRKAB items due to this item having the largest
amount of polarity. This made it much simpler to create the two categories of
participants. Three participants were excluded from the analyses because they indicated
they neither approved nor disapproved of the statement and therefore could not be
categorized as either “pro” or “anti” drug. This left 127 participants in the “Pro-Drug”
attitude group and 72 participants in the “Anti-Drug” attitude group.
A 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome condition (negative, no
outcome, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the between-subjects factors for
participant ratings on the likelihood that the treatment would be successful. The range for
this item was 100, with a minimum rating of 0 and a maximum of 100. The average
rating was 66.56 (SD = 21.31), skewness was -1.01, and kurtosis was .93. There was a
significant main effect of condition, (Positive - M = 73.30, SD = 18.24, Control - M =
66.24, SD = 14.72, Negative - M = 61.56, SD = 25.86), F (2, 193) = 7.15, p = .001, η2p =
.07, but not of attitude, (Pro-Drug (M = 68.89, SD = 18.74), Anti-Drug (M = 73.32, SD =
24.96), F (1, 193) = 2.65, p = .11, η2p = .01. There was a strong tendency towards

19
statistical significance for the interaction of outcome condition by attitude, F (2, 193) =
3.04, p = 0.050, η2p =.03. Simple main effects analyses showed that the effect of
outcome was significant only for the anti-drug participants, F (2, 80) = 6.27, p = .003,
η2p = .14, but not for the pro-drug participants. Anti-drug participants in both conditions
exhibited hindsight bias while pro-drug participants did not exhibit the bias in either
condition. See Figure 3 for the likelihood of improvement interaction between outcome
condition and drug attitude and Table 3 for descriptive statistics associated with the
interaction.

Figure 2. Attitude of Illegal Drugs Distribution (n = 202). Participants who disagreed
with the statement “All illegal drugs are harmful to your health” were categorized as
“Pro-Drug” participants (n = 127). Those who agreed with the statement were
categorized as “Anti-Drug” participants (n = 72). Three participants were excluded
from the analyses for responding to the item with “Neutral.”

20

Figure 3. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Likelihood Ratings (n =
199). Error bars represent 95% C.I.

Table 3. Likelihood of Improvement as a Function of Outcome and Drug Attitudes.
Outcome Condition

Pro-Drug

Anti-Drug

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

Negative

66.9

20.1

48

53.3

31.5

31

Control

68.5

15.4

40

62.3

12.8

23

Positive

71.8

20.2

39

76.6

13.0

18

Note. n = 199
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A different way to examine hindsight effects is to use a priori contrasts. Among
anti-drug participants, those who received a positive outcome rated likelihood of
improvement significantly higher than those in the control condition, t(193) = 2.23,
p = .03, d = 1.11, while those receiving a negative outcome rated likelihood of
improvement significantly lower than the control condition, t(193)= 1.6, p =.11, d =
.37. Contrasts for pro-drug participants revealed no difference between the control
condition and either the positive outcome condition, t(193) = .71, p = .48, d = .18, or
the negative outcome condition, t(193) = .37, p = .71, d = .09.
Ratings Associated with Cognitive Sense-Making Model
Surprise Ratings. A 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome
condition (negative, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the between-subjects
factors for participant ratings of outcome surprisingness. The range for this item was 5,
with a minimum rating of 1 and a maximum of 6. The average rating was 3.10 (SD =
1.61), skewness was .29, and kurtosis was -1.18. There was not a significant main effect
of drug attitude on surprise ratings, (Pro-Drug - M = 3.22, SD = 1.60, Anti-Drug - M =
2.92, SD = 1.63), F (1, 132) =2.18, p = .14, d = .19. Participants receiving a negative
outcome were more surprised (M = 3.9, SD = 1.5) than those receiving a positive
outcome (M = 2.1, SD = 1.2), F(1, 132) = 48.38, p < .001, d = 1.4. A marginally
significant interaction of outcome condition by attitude, however, indicated that both proand anti-drug participants rated the positive as less surprising than the negative outcome
but that pro-drug participants rated the negative outcome as more surprising than the antidrug participants, F(1, 132) = .20, p = .088, η2p = .02. See Figure 4 for the surprise
ratings interaction between outcome condition and drug attitude.

22
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Figure 4. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Surprise Ratings (n = 136).
Error bars represent 95% C.I.

Pezzo's (2003) sense-making model states that surprise ratings should be
negatively correlated with hindsight bias scores. Consistent with this model, overall, as a
person’s rating of how surprised they were at the outcome increased, the less they
exhibited the bias, r(135) = -.63, p<.001. Follow up within-cell correlations based on
outcome condition (positive, negative) and drug attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) were used
to examine whether there were differences in the relationship based on these groups. If
pro-drug participants received a negative outcome, they exhibited more hindsight bias
when they were less surprised by the outcome, r(52) = -.65, p<.001. Similarly, but with a
stronger relationship, anti-drug participants who received a negative outcome also
exhibited more of the bias when they were less surprised by the outcome, r(32) = -.72, p
< .001. When pro-drug participants received a positive outcome, they showed a larger

23
hindsight bias when they were less surprised at the outcome, r(39) = -.58, p <.001. When
anti-drug participants received a positive outcome, they showed a larger hindsight bias
when they were less surprised, r(18) = -.50, p = .03.
Sense-Making Ratings. A 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome
condition (negative, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the between-subjects
factors for participant ratings of how much sense the outcome made. The range for this
item was 5, with a minimum rating of 1 and a maximum of 6. The average rating was
3.65 (SD = 1.53), skewness was .04, and kurtosis was -1.18. Participants receiving a
positive outcome were more able to make more sense of the outcome (M = 4.5, SD = 1.4)
than those who received a negative outcome (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4), F (1, 132) = 29.83, p <
.001, d = 1.0. There was no effect of attitude, (Pro-Drug - M = 3.59, SD = 1.45), AntiDrug - M = 3.76, SD = 1.64), F (1, 132) =.97, p = .33, d = .11, nor a significant outcome
condition by attitude interaction F(1, 132) = .53, p = .47, η2p = .004. See Figure 5 for the
sense-making ratings interaction between outcome condition and drug attitude.
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Figure 5. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Sense Ratings (n = 136).
Error bars represent 95% C.I.
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Again, Pezzo's (2003) sense-making model states that sense ratings should be
positively correlated with hindsight bias scores. Consistent with this model, overall, as a
person’s rating of how much sense the outcome made to them, the more they exhibited
the bias, r(135) = .30, p<.001. Follow up within-cell correlations based on outcome
condition (positive, negative) and drug attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) was used to examine
whether there were differences in the relationship based on these groups. There was not a
significant relationship between sense-making and hindsight bias for either pro-drug
participants, r(52) = .15, p = .28, or for anti-drug participants who received a negative
outcome, r(32) = .09, p = .61. When pro-drug participants received a positive outcome,
they showed a larger hindsight bias when they were able to make more sense out of the
outcome, r(39) = .74, p <.001. When anti-drug participants received a positive outcome,
however, there was no significant relationship, r(18) = .20, p = .41.
Outcome Manipulation Checks
Additional items were administered to examine how participants perceived the
child’s situation and the outcome. These items are considered manipulation checks to
ensure that participants were reading the vignette thoroughly and to ensure that the
positive and negative outcomes were successful manipulations. These included how
confident they would need to be that the drug would improve the child’s condition in
order to administer that treatment to a child, how risky they rated the unconventional
treatment, and how severe the participant rated the child’s condition. A Pearson’s
correlation was run between hindsight bias scores, criterion, risk, and severity ratings.
There was a marginally significant correlation between hindsight bias score and criterion
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score, r(135) = .14, p = .10, meaning that the more confident the person needed to be
about the effectiveness of the treatment before giving it to their own child, the more they
exhibited the bias. There was no correlation between hindsight bias score and risk rating,
r (135) = .04, p = .68. There was also no correlation between hindsight bias score and
severity rating, r (135) = -.05, p = .58.
Criterion. A 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome condition
(negative, control, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the between-subjects
factors for participants’ ratings of how confident they would have to be in the drug’s
effectiveness before giving it to their own child (criterion). The range for this item was
100, with a minimum rating of 0 and a maximum of 100. The average rating was 70.88
(SD = 23.93), skewness was -.89, and kurtosis was .37.

There was not a significant

main effect of outcome condition, (Positive - M = 74.96, SD = 20.13, Control - M =
71.98, SD = 25.61, Negative - M = 67.47, SD = 24.81), F (1, 193) = 2.06, p = .13, η2p =
.02. There was a significant main effect of attitude, where anti-drug participants needed
to be more confident (M = 76.4, SD = 24.8) in the drug’s effectiveness than pro-drug
participants (M = 69.0, SD = 23.0), F (1, 193) = 6.46, p < .05, η2p = .03. There was not a
significant outcome condition by attitude interaction F (2, 193) = .35, p = .71, η2p = .004.
See Figure 6 for the criterion ratings interaction between outcome condition and drug
attitude.

Criterion
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Figure 6. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Criterion Ratings (n =
199). Error bars represent 95% C.I.

Ratings of Risk. A 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome
condition (negative, control, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the betweensubjects factors for participant ratings of risk. The range for this item was 5, with a
minimum rating of 1 and a maximum of 6. The average rating was 3.39 (SD = 1.53),
skewness was .07, and kurtosis was -1.01. There was not a significant main effect of
outcome condition, (Positive - M = 74.96, SD = 20.13, Control - M = 71.98, SD = 25.61,
Negative - M = 67.47, SD = 24.81), F (1, 193) =.36, p = .70, η2p = .004. However, there
was a significant main effect of attitude, where anti-drug participants rated the treatment
as riskier (M = 4.0, SD = 1.6) than pro-drug participants (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4), F (1, 193) =
16.73, p < .001, η2p = .08. There was not a significant outcome condition by attitude
interaction F (2, 193) = .97, p = .38, η2p = .01. See Figure 7 for the risk ratings interaction
between outcome condition and drug attitude.

Ratings of Risk
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Figure 7. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Ratings of Risk (n = 199).
Error bars represent 95% C.I.

Condition Severity. A 3 X 2 factorial ANOVA was conducted with outcome
condition (negative, control, positive) and attitude (anti-drug, pro-drug) as the betweensubjects factors for participant ratings of severity. The range for this item was 5, with a
minimum rating of 1 and a maximum of 6. The average rating was 4.91 (SD = .92),
skewness was -1.00, and kurtosis was 1.68.

There was not a significant main effect of

outcome condition, (Positive - M = 4.86, SD = 1.03, Control - M = 7.97, SD = .86,
Negative - M = 4.90, SD = .89), F (2, 193) =.32, p = .72, η2p = .003. There was not a
significant main effect of attitude. (Pro-Drug - M = 4.88, SD = .89, Anti-Drug - M = 4.96,
SD = .97), F (1, 193) = .25, p = .62, η2p = .001. There was not a significant outcome
condition by attitude interaction, F (2, 193) = .20, p = .82, η2p = .002. See Figure 8 for the
risk ratings interaction between outcome condition and drug attitude.

Severity of Child's Condition
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Figure 8. Interaction between Outcome and Drug Attitude for Condition Severity
Ratings (n = 199). Error bars represent 95% C.I.

29

Discussion
According to Pezzo’s (2003) cognitive sense-making model, participants who
received an expected outcome (e.g., pro-drug participants who received a positive
outcome) should exhibit no hindsight bias. Those who received an unexpected outcome
(e.g., pro-drug participants who received a negative outcome) should exhibit hindsight
bias, but only if they were able to effectively make sense of it. In contrast, the
motivational model (Louie, 1999; Mark & Mellor, 1991) predicts that only favorable
outcomes or outcomes that are consistent with one’s beliefs will produce hindsight bias.
The control conditions in this study indicate that although those with a pro-drug
view rated the likelihood of a positive outcome greater than those with a negative view,
the difference was relatively small. More important, both the pro and anti-drug
conditions expected a positive outcome (68% and 62%, respectively). Thus, the single
item used from the Drug-Related Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs Scale (DRKAB)
(Bryan, 2000) does not appear to have been the best indicator of the participants’
expectations for a positive outcome.
This is not to say that a positive outcome was viewed as inevitable by either
group. Anti-drug participants still held a 38% expectation that a negative outcome would
occur, and pro-drug participants held a 32% expectation. Thus, either outcome -- negative
or positive -- should produce at least some surprise, and thus some hindsight bias. The
cognitive model would, however, predict a larger bias for the negative outcome in both
groups because it is more unexpected than a positive outcome. Finally, recall from Pezzo
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(2003) that sense-making is necessary for hindsight bias to occur. If participants cannot
make sense of an unexpected outcome, they still will not exhibit hindsight bias. With this
in mind, let us consider each condition. First we consider conditions that are most
threatening to participants.
Pro-Drug Attitude and Negative Outcome
These participants generally expected a positive outcome -- those in control
condition rated the likelihood of the child's improvement to be about 68%. When
presented instead with a negative outcome, these participants showed no bias at all (d =
.09, p = .71). The motivational model predicted that participants would not exhibit any
bias because the outcome is threatening to their belief. In contrast, the cognitive sensemaking model predicted that a negative outcome, because it was relatively unexpected,
would produce a hindsight bias. The lack of a bias in this condition would seem to be
supportive of a defensive processing mechanism (Louie, 1999; Mark and Mellor, 1991).
Recall, however, that a lack of hindsight bias can still be explained by the cognitive
model if participants are unable to make sense of the outcome. Although sense-making
ratings were lower for pro-drug participants than for anti-drug participants, the difference
was quite small. Further, the within-cell correlation between individual hindsight bias
scores and sense-making was not significant, indicating that the usual cognitive sensemaking process may have been circumvented. Perhaps participants in this condition were
so invested in the idea that marijuana is a beneficial medical treatment that they refused
to make sense of the outcome.
One measure that could help address this is the length of time participants spent
trying to make sense before they responded. If participants spent little or no time, this
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would suggest participants refuse to even try to make sense of the outcome. If they took a
relatively long time before responding this would instead suggest that sense-making was
attempted, but failed. Unfortunately, reaction time was not recorded in this study.
Anti-Drug Attitude and Positive Outcome
For anti-drug participants, a positive outcome is clearly threatening and according
to a motivational model should, produce no bias. But the outcome was also found to be
at least somewhat unexpected. Recall, control participants rated a 62% likelihood of
improvement and thus a 38% likelihood that the child would not improve. To the extent
that the positive outcome was at least somewhat surprising initially, the cognitive model
would predict at least a small hindsight bias for this condition. In fact, results indicated
that participants exhibited the largest bias (d = 1.11) out of all conditions. One possibility
is that the outcome that was provided was not the outcome that control participants were
considering when they rated its likelihood. If the outcome was more dramatic than
control participants were imagining, a large hindsight bias would be predicted by the
cognitive model. Unexpectedly, the correlation between hindsight bias scores and sensemaking ratings was not significant. This might have been caused, however, by a ceiling
effect for this condition, as their sense-making ratings were the highest of any condition.
This large bias is not consistent with defensive processing mechanism of the
motivational model because it is presumably threatening to participants’ beliefs regarding
the use of this medical treatment. The (surprising) fact that these participants were better
able to make sense of the outcome than any other condition may indicate that they were
also able to reduce the threat they felt from the outcome. Either that or participants were
able to find a number of reasons for the positive outcome that still supported their belief
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(Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007) or they changed their minds and decided that medical marijuana
is, perhaps, not as bad as they thought. In either case, one would expect that a
considerable amount of sense-making would occur, resulting in the large bias.
Pro-Drug Attitude and Positive Outcome
The remaining two conditions presented outcomes that were not threatening
but expected and consistent with participants’ beliefs. A positive outcome for these
participants is completely consistent with their belief and so there is reason from a
defensive processing perspective to exhibit hindsight bias based on the motivational
model of hindsight bias. Based on this model, it was predicted that participants would
exhibit hindsight bias because the outcome was consistent with their beliefs, making it
more likely that they could have predicted the outcome. However, the non-occurrence of
the bias does not support this model.
On the other hand, there is also not much reason to engage in sense-making either,
even a slightly surprising outcome, if it is consistent with one's strongly held belief
system. It is important to note that of the four outcomes, this is the least incongruent, and
so the cognitive sense-making model would predict no hindsight bias in this
condition. Results showed that participants did not show the bias, supporting the
cognitive sense-making model’s prediction. This result is further supported by the high
sense-making and low surprise ratings by these participants. Unlike the other conditions,
there was a very significant within-cell correlation between hindsight bias scores and
sense-making, further supporting the notion that the outcome was expected and made
sense to the participants. Participants were expecting the child to get better based on their
pro-drug attitude/belief, so when they learned that the child’s condition did improve, they
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were not surprised. This, in turn, meant they did not have to search for information to
explain the outcome -- the sense-making process was not activated – resulting in no bias.
Because the outcome is also not threatening, there is no need to consider it further.
Anti-Drug Attitude and Negative Outcome
Finally, a negative outcome is consistent with participants’ anti-drug belief and
thus a bias should occur according to the defensive model. A bias is also consistent with
the cognitive model to the extent that these participants expected a positive outcome.
Indeed, this condition did produce a bias, albeit one with a relatively small effect size.
Note however, that anti-drug participants had more difficulty making sense of this
outcome than they did the positive outcome. Thus, the modest bias size is to be expected
by cognitive model.
Conclusion
In review, predictions from the cognitive sense-making model were supported in
two conditions: (1) when the bias occurred for anti-drug participants who received a
positive outcome and (2) when no bias occurred for pro-drug participants who received a
positive outcome. For the latter group of participants, the positive correlation between
hindsight bias scores and sense-making support the cognitive sense-making model, which
states that as long as the person is able to make sense of the outcome they will show more
hindsight bias (Pezzo, 2003). The model also states that the more surprising the person
finds the outcome to be, the smaller the bias will be, which is exactly what was exhibited
by participants.
For pro-drug participants who received a negative outcome, the non-occurrence of
the bias primarily supports the motivational model. If these participants were unable to
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make sense of the outcome, however, then the lack of bias could still be explained by the
cognitive sense-making model. Unfortunately, it cannot be definitely stated that
participants were unable to make sense of the bias due to the non-significant within-cell
correlation between sense-making and individual hindsight bias scores. Finally, both the
motivational and the cognitive sense-making models are supported when the bias
occurred for anti-drug participants who received a negative outcome.
Regardless of the outcome, anti-drug participants thought the treatment was
riskier and that a “minimally competent doctor” needed to be more certain that the
treatment would work before administering this treatment compared to pro-drug
participants. Although it did not matter which condition participants were in, compared
to pro-drug participants, anti-drug participants thought the treatment was riskier and
thought that a “minimally competent doctor” needed to be more certain that the treatment
would work before administering this treatment.
One limitation for this study is that the DRKAB scale item that was used to create
the pro- and anti-drug groups was an all-encompassing statement (i.e., “All illegal drugs
are equally harmful to your health”). Again, this item was used, as opposed to using a
sum score across all DRKAB items because of the largest amount of polarity. Participants
may have been thinking about more damaging drugs such as cocaine or heroin, and
marijuana was not actively entertained. Another limitation is that specific pre- and postattitude measures were not collected to assess whether participants’ views changed after
reading the vignette. In the vignette, participants were given both pro and con arguments
for using this type of treatment on the child, which may have provided the participant
with new information they were not previously aware of. Attitude groups were created
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by combining different levels of agreement/disagreement to the above DRKAB item;
participants who only “somewhat” agreed with the statement were grouped together with
participants who “strongly” agreed. Some participants who only slightly
agreed/disagreed with the statement could have changed their minds after reading the
scenario, which would directly affect all proceeding responses to questions and perhaps
the magnitude of their bias.
In conclusion, there is no one model that accounts for the results in the present
study. Future research should focus on determining the true mechanism behind how
hindsight bias is affected by strongly held beliefs such as protected values or moral
values. Although marijuana is a controversial topic, it is becoming decriminalized in
states around the U.S. and medical marijuana is becoming more acceptable across the
nation (National Conference of State Legislature, 2015). It would be interesting to
examine how beliefs regarding other controversial topics such as gun control laws or the
death penalty affect hindsight bias. These topics may have a stronger protected values
(e.g., all life is valuable, therefore we should not have the death penalty), which may
yield different results from this current study. Perhaps after learning more about the
mechanism associated with these values, one of these models may become more
supported or a new revised model of hindsight bias might be developed.
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Appendix A: Study Vignette
John and Sarah Smith have a seven-year-old son, Josh, who has been diagnosed
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which is a developmental disability that can
cause significant social, communication and behavioral challenges. Josh has had this
diagnosis for almost four years now and has encountered problems with both his
communication skills and his behavior. Recently, Josh has started showing signs of selfinjurious behavior to include slapping/punching himself, butting his head against the
wall, and biting himself. This has led to numerous trips to the emergency room.
Josh’s parents are very concerned about these new and dangerous behaviors and
make an appointment with Josh’s neuropsychiatrist, Dr. Henry Ellis, to discuss what
treatment options are available to them. Once Dr. Ellis has examined Josh and reviews
his charts and medical history, he tells John and Sarah that they have run out of new
conventional medication options for Josh. He has been on all possible medications that
can be prescribed for a child with ASD and none of them seem to have slowed the
development of the self-injurious behaviors.
"We can keep Josh on the medication he is currently taking and see if they have
any effect on these new behaviors. However, in my opinion, I don't think the medication
will be able to help Josh any more than it already has" says Dr. Ellis.
Seeing how distraught this information makes the parents, Dr. Ellis then tells
them that there might be one unconventional treatment they can try. He explains there
have been some cases where children in the same predicament as Josh have been given
marijuana in liquid/pill form, and it seems to decrease the self-injurious behavior
significantly. He explains that if they use a form of marijuana that produces a sedative
effect without creating the stereotypical "high" feeling, this may calm Josh down during
an episode where he begins to hurt himself.
Dr. Ellis goes on to say that even though there are some cases in which this
unconventional treatment has worked, there are also some credible reasons why they
should not try this treatment. It is still illegal at the federal level to use marijuana and
there is no empirical research that evaluates the long-term neurological side effects of
semi-regular marijuana use. This is a very big decision and Dr. Ellis warns them not to
take this decision lightly. He suggests that John and Sarah go home, take some time to
think about it, research it, and have a serious discussion. After that, if they would like to
try giving Josh marijuana to treat his self-injurious behavior, then they should call the
office.
After another two weeks and more episodes of Josh hurting himself, Sarah calls Dr. Ellis’
office and tells him they would like to try the marijuana treatment. Dr. Ellis prescribes
the marijuana for Josh, and requests his parents bring him back in one month to see how
he is doing.
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Appendix B: Study Outcomes
Positive Outcome One Month Follow Up:
At their one-month follow up, John and Sarah both describe how shocked they are
at the improvement that Josh has made while using the marijuana treatment. They are
thrilled to say that he has not suffered an episode where he has hit/punched/bit himself in
close to three weeks. And, the few episodes that have occurred have been less extreme
than before.
Negative Outcome One Month Follow Up:
At their one-month follow up, John and Sarah both describe how disappointed
they are that this treatment, like the others, has not worked. And not only has it not
worked, but Josh’s self-injurious behaviors have increased. He is now having multiple
episodes each day, and he is the most violent he has ever been. Josh's parents request that
the marijuana treatment be stopped immediately.
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Appendix C: Drug-Related Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs Scale
In the following section you will find some statements / questions about drug use and
drug users. These statements do not necessarily express our feelings. We are interested in
finding out how you feel (i.e., your opinion) about these issues. There are no right or
wrong answers to any of these statements; people have widely different views. Try not to
rush through, nor to ponder too long over any question. Please choose your level of
agreement for each statement using the scale below.

Strongly

Moderately

Slightly

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

1

2

3

Neutral

4

Slightly

Moderately

Strongly

Agree

Agree

Agree

5

6

6

1. All illegal drugs are equally harmful to your health.
2. Our society is too tolerant towards people who use drugs.
4 I see people who are addicted to drugs more as criminals than as victims.
5. Most young people today try marijuana.
6. Alcohol abuse causes more problems in society than drug abuse.
7. Treatment should only be given to people addicted to drugs who intend to give up
drugs for good.
8. I would tend to avoid someone who is addicted to drugs.
9. I would be nervous around someone who uses illegal drugs.
10. Money spent on the prevention of drug abuse is money well spent.
11. The use of marijuana should not be against the law.
12. People who are addicted to drugs are not given a fair chance to get along in society.
13. Occasional use of marijuana is not really dangerous.
14. People who end up with a drug problem have only themselves to blame.
15. Drugs are not really a problem in this country.
16. Treatment should be available to all people who are addicted to drugs.
17. People who are addicted to drugs really scare me.
18. Tougher sentences for people who abuse drugs is the answer to the drug problem in
this country.
19. Most people are concerned about the drug problem in the United States.
20. Many people who are addicted to drugs exaggerate their troubles to get sympathy.
21. It is normal that young people will try drugs at least once.
22. The drug problem in the United States is out of control.
23. Almost all people who are addicted to drugs addicts are dangerous.
24. Drug education in schools should start at the primary level.
25. Drug related crime is a major problem in the United States today.
26. Reports about the extent of drug use among young people are exaggerated by the
media.
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27. People who are addicted to drugs who are charged with petty offenses should be
given a choice between treatment and time in prison.
28. It would bother me to live near a person who is addicted to drugs.
29. Regular use of marijuana is just as dangerous to your health as regular use of heroin.
30. The availability of illegal drugs poses a great threat to young people.
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Appendix D: Demographic Questionnaire
1. What is your age?
2. Gender
a. Male
b. Female
c. I wish not to answer
3. What is your ethnicity?
a. American Indian/Alaskan
b. Hawaiian Native or other Pacific Islander
c. Black
d. Asian American
e. Hispanic
f. White
g. Other (Please Identify) _________________________________
h. I wish not answer
4. What is your religious preference?
a. Agnostic
b. Atheist
c. Buddhism
d. Christianity
e. Islam
f. Judaism
g. Other (Please Identify) ______________________________________
h. I wish not to answer
5. Have you ever used marijuana?
a. I've never tried marijuana
b. I've tried it but only once or twice
c. I use it on occasion
d. I use it regularly
6. Do you personally know anyone that is currently using marijuana?
a. Yes
b. No
7. Do you favor legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
a. Yes
b. No
8. Do you favor laws legalizing the use of medical marijuana for adults under
medical supervision?
a. Yes
b. No
9. Do you favor laws legalizing the use of medical marijuana for children under
medical supervision?
a. Yes
b. No
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Appendix E: Follow-Up Questionnaire
Given To All Outcome Conditions:
1. Consider Josh's condition before the marijuana treatment began.
severe you perceived his condition to be.
1
2
Not severe at all

3

4

Please indicate how

5

6
Extremely

severe
2. Please choose Josh’s diagnosis
a) Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)
b) Epilepsy
c) Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD)
3. Please choose the correct outcome of Josh's treatment.
a) Josh's self-injurious behavior increased after receiving the marijuana treatment.
b) Josh's self-injurious behavior decreased after receiving the marijuana treatment.
c) There was no change in Josh's self-injurious behavior after receiving the
marijuana treatment.
d) I don't know the outcome of the treatment.
4. Given what you know about this case, how likely is it that the use of marijuana will
decrease Josh’s self-injurious behavior? (Wording slightly changed in positive/negative
condition; see below).
0%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
5. How risky do you think it was for Dr. Ellis to suggest the use of liquid marijuana to
treat Josh’s self-injurious behavior?
1
2
Not risky at all

3

4

5

6
Completely

risky
6. Standard of care is typically defined as "that which a minimally competent physician in
the same field would do under similar circumstances". Do you think that Dr. Ellis met
the standard of care while treating Josh?
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a. If “YES” → You just indicated that you believe Dr. Ellis DID meet the
standard of care. Please list all of the reasons you considered when
making this determination.
b. If “NO” → You just indicated that you believe Dr. Ellis did NOT meet the
standard of care. Please list all of the reasons you considered when
making this determination.
7. When thinking about the success of the drug, how sure should a minimally competent
physician be before prescribing marijuana to a child?
0%-------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
Additional Items Given In Positive/Negative Outcome Condition:
1. If you did not have knowledge of the outcome, how likely would you have thought it
that the treatment would work? (Wording slightly changed in the no outcome condition;
see above)
0%-------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
2. To what extent were you surprised by the outcome?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6
Completely

3. To what extent does it make sense to you that the use of marijuana decreased/increased
Josh’s self-injurious behavior?
1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6
Completely

